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PART I. INTRODUCTION
The competitive zeal ingrained in the very fiber of American culture is perhaps
never more clearly manifested than in the love of sports. This desire for competition
begins in the childhoods of millions of young Americans, and drives the most dedicated
and talented athletes into the zenith of whatever sport they choose to pursue.
Unfortunately, as has been evidenced by the recent performance-enhancing drug1 [fn
should be after comma] scandals in Major League Baseball, this competitive ambition
can lead elite athletes to seek physiological advantages over their peers by immersing
themselves in the experimental use of drugs.2 The ethical quandaries this poses for the
competitive integrity of the sports themselves are many; however, the athletes themselves
are at the very least capable of making informed decisions on the possible benefits they
could reap from such a course of action (such as better statistics, possible increase in
salary, etc.) versus the risks (possible adverse physical side-effects, long-term damage,
etc.).3
Alas, with respect to the “athletes” of one of the world’s oldest sports—that of
horse racing—horses are unable to make such decisions based upon informed consent.4 It
is indeed possible that if the highly decorated thoroughbred Big Brown could have

Performance-enhancing drug (“PED”) is a broad, all-encompassing term that can refer to any number of
traditional drugs (steroids, human growth hormone, etc.) or nontraditional (cobra venom) to bolster or
augment existing physical prowess for training or performance purposes to gain an advantage on
competition. Competitive sports leagues at every level have almost universally banned the use of PEDs, but
as will be explored in the foregoing sections, horse racing has generally taken a far more passive posture
towards banning these drugs.
2
Daniel Engber, Hi-Ho, Steroids, Away!, Slate, (June 27, 2008),
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2008/06/hiho_steroids_away.html.
3
Id.
4
Id.
1

1

spoken during his career, he too would have deemed it prudent to take Winstrol5 in the
pursuit of winning a race, with the aim of being able to retire earlier to a lush farm replete
with an abundance of hay and oats.6 It is this impropriety that allows horses to be
exploited via the administration of PEDs solely to further the interests of the trainers,
owners and jockeys (among others), thereby compromising the competitive integrity of
the sport by obliterating any semblance of an even playing field, and more egregiously
endangering the well-being of the animals.7 [Consequently?] This article will explore the
prevalence of PEDs within the horse racing world, the significant issues this creates for
the safety of the animals, as well as some proposed policy changes both via federal
regulation and through industry reform for curbing this ever-increasing problem. [Besides
the horses, aren’t jockeys “athletes” in horseracing too, just as race drivers are in auto
racing?]
Performance-enhancing drugs abuse may be the biggest issue facing horse racing
in the United States.8 A 2012 investigation reported that 3,800 horses had tested positive
for drugs, the majority for illegal levels of prescription drugs.9 The investigation
indicated that approximately 24 horses a week die at racetracks in America, an
exponentially greater number than in other countries.10 The wide-spread use of injurymasking and performance-enhancing drugs has led to the creation of a crisis in the
industry that is destroying the reputation of the sport, along with the far worse

5

A very common and pervasive drug administered to horses to boost physical acumen. [Should be in
sentence form—not just a clause]
6
Engber, supra note 2.
7
Id.
8
John T. Wendt, Article, Horse Racing in the United States: A Call for a Harmonized Approach to AntiDoping Regulation, 25 J. Legal Aspects Of Sport 176 (2015).
9
Id. at 176.
10
Id.
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consequence of sabotaging the health of these majestic animals.11 Because there are 38
separate state racing commissions with different sets of rules and practices, the horse
racing industry is struggling to reach any degree of uniformity with respect to testing
standards and punishment for violations.12
This article and accompanying statistics will address the adverse effects of drug
abuse in the three main types of horse racing: flat racing (which includes thoroughbred
racing), harness racing (also known as “trotting” or “pacing” with a two-wheeled cart),
and steeplechase.13 An in-depth analysis of the disjointed regulatory scheme affecting the
various types of horse racing, and the accompanying issues it breeds, will be borne out in
the foregoing sections. Part II of this article will provide an historical background of the
sport itself, including its ancient origins and evolution over time, along with the rise of
PEDs within the sport, highlighting some recent high visibility scandals that have brought
renewed attention to this issue.
Part III will address the details around the PEDs themselves, including the effects
they have on the animals. Part IV will examine the underlying reasons PED abuse has
become so rampant in the sport, highlighting the influx of gambling money into the
industry. This section will also touch on the general lack of a centralized system of
oversight to govern and enforce anti-PED measures, including the lack of uniformity in
penalties among the various racing jurisdictions. There will also be a discussion on the
governance model employed by horse racing and an exploration of specific regulatory
and legislative controls that already exist, as well as their shortcomings. Part V will
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Id.
Id.
13 th
9 Race, Types of Horse Races, http://www.9thrace.com/handicapping/types-of-horse-races.html(last
visited Apr. 20, 2017).
12
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propose a number of possible remedies to the aforementioned issues, including the
implementation of a federal regulation, the establishment of a central governing body to
oversee the sport on a quasi-independent basis from the government, a joint effort by the
horse racing community and elected officials to fund new testing methods for PEDs, and
a number of proposed penalties for violations. [Don’t need to list each “remedy” in Intro]
Part VI will offer a summation of key points and a final conclusion.
PART II. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Origins of and Rationale for Horse Racing
[Put this paragraph at end of section]The anatomy of the horse lends itself
perfectly to competitive racing.14 A horse’s legs are "clean and long" consisting of strong
bones, muscles and tendons. “When running, its rear legs act as springs when they bend
and straighten, propelling the horse forward”.15 The front legs continue this motion as
they pull the horse forward. “Thoroughbreds also possess a long neck which moves in
rhythm with their legs”.16 This rhythm allows the horses to extend their stride fully,
enabling them to reach and sustain speeds surpassing forty miles per hour.17
[This paragraph should start section, not the prior one]The sport of horse racing is
one of world’s oldest, with records of it tracing as far back as 4500 BCE.18 Organized
horse racing dates back as far as 638 BCE as an event in the ancient Greek Olympics.19

14

Kyle Cassidy, Comment, Reining in the Use of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Horseracing: Why a
Federal Regulation is Needed, 24 Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 121, 125 (2014). [How different are your
remedies from his?]
15
Id. at 125.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Luke P. Breslin, Comment, Reclaiming the Glory in the “Sport of Kings” – Uniformity is the Answer, 20
Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 297, 300 (2010).
19
Id. at 300.
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Modern horse racing originated around the 12th century, when English knights returned
from the Crusades with Arabian horses, which were known for their speed.20 The history
of thoroughbred horseracing in the United States, however, dates back to the mid-18th
century.21 The first recorded instance of it took place in 1745 in Annapolis, Maryland,
when Governor Samuel Olge "first staged a thoroughbred race in English Style,”
meaning a race of thoroughbred horses, with mounted jockeys, running a dirt or grass
racecourse at distances ranging from three-quarters of a mile to two miles.22
The popularity of horse racing continued to surge in the United States, with its
peak arriving in the mid-Twentieth century. Spectator attendance at tracks between the
years of 1946 and 1973 increased from 26 million to 53.3 million.23 The last several
decades have seen a decrease in attendance and general interest in the sport, although the
seminal events of horse racing, especially the American Triple Crown and Breeder’s Cup,
continue to solicit enormous interest.24
B. The Role of Gambling in Horseracing
In evaluating the primary reasons for the original rise in popularity of the sport
and the [sustained level?] levels of interest that continue to be seen today, horse racing’s
inextricable link to gambling cannot be ignored. Historically, “bookmakers” would set
the odds of a given horse winning a race and then solicit people to gamble against them
based on those odds. This served as the original link between horse racing and
gambling.25 In the early Twentieth Century, bookmakers and prominent members of local

20

Id.
Id. at 298.
22
Id. at 301.
23
Id. at 302.
24
Id.
25
Bradley S. Friedman, Oats, Water, Hay and Everything Else: The Regulation of Anabolic Steroids in
Thoroughbred Horse Racing, 16 Animal L.123, 128 (2009). [[Animal L. J.??]
21
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jockey clubs26 shared mutual benefits in this enterprise. By taking bets at the track, larger
bookmakers would draw customers to the races and pay the track owners a fee for
running their gambling operation on location.27 The racetrack owners likely encouraged
bookmakers because their presence attracted customers and allowed the owners to
increase purse sizes for winning horses and thus attract more racers and greater esteem.28
It was out of this culture that the American Jockey Club was born. The Jockey
Club was founded (and continues to operate) as a private organization, with backing and
support from industry officials and stakeholders.29 It was initially tasked with the
ostensible purpose to promote and improve the sport. In reality, it had the constructive
purpose of regulating the rampant presence of gambling, a function it would serve until
state racing commissions interceded later in the Twentieth Century.30
Gambling on horse racing today is called pari-mutuel wagering, a system wherein
the race track receives a fixed percentage of the total amount wagered in order to cover
expenses, such as operating costs, racing purses and state and local taxes.31 Once these
expenses are subtracted from the total amount, the balance is returned to a pool and
shared among all winning bets. 32 Given the robust enthusiasm for sports betting in the
United States, as is evidenced not only with horse racin, but by the ever-growing “fantasy

26

Decentralized organizations that oversee and register horses for racing events.
Friedman, supra note 25, at 128, 129.
28
Id. at 129.
29
Medication and Performance Enhancing Drugs in Horse Racing: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 112th Cong. 26 (2012) (statement of James Gagliano.
President and C.E.O of the Jockey Club), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112shrg76248/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76248.pdf.
30
Friedman, supra note 25, at 129.
31
Breslin, supra note 18, at 302.
32
Id.
27
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sports”33 industry, [fn should be placed after comma] it is of little surprise that parimutuel wagering occupies such an integral role in the vitality of the sport. Unfortunately,
certain horse racing industry members resort to unethical or illegal means to gain a
competitive advantage in the name of heightened earnings or the prestige of greater
success. The most obvious way to achieve this has been through illicitly augmenting the
physical characteristics of the horses via performance-enhancing drugs.
C. The Rise of Performance-Enhancing Drugs and Accompanying Scandals
It is unclear precisely when performance-enhancing drugs became a staple of
modern horse racing, but all indications are it began as far back as the early Twentieth
Century.34 The New York Times reported the developments of drug use in horseracing
during the 1890s.35 The 1800s had seen the purification of cocaine and morphine and
availability of these substances made the “acute stimulant medication” of racing horses a
far more common occurrence.36 Steroids37 did not emerge as a performance-enhancing
tool until the 1960’s. They were used in equine veterinary medicine to treat horses that
suffered from dangerously decreased muscle mass, and were given to geldings38
regardless of their physical state.39 It is unclear when the use of steroids as a performance

33

Although there is no consensus as to whether fantasy sports constitute formal wagering, the basic
principle is that users select certain athletes to produce favorable statistics over a set period of time (single
game, season) etc. Point values are assigned to statistical thresholds being met, and winners are determined
by whoever earns the most points at the conclusion of the time period. See generally Louis Bien,
Everything you ever wanted to know about daily fantasy sports and why they’re getting sued, SB Nation
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.sbnation.com/2015/11/24/9791608/draftkings-fanduel-daily-fantasy-sportslawsuit-new-york-internet-gambling. [Last visited?]
34
Bennett Liebman, The Trainer Responsibility Rule in Horse Racing, 7 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J.1, 4 (2007).
35
Id. at 5.
36
Id. at 4.
37
Generally considered to be any form of hormonal substance closely related to the male hormone
testosterone. [Write in sentences] In addition to naturally occurring testosterone, steroids can be
synthetically created in laboratories for a variety of medical purposes. See Friedman, note 97, at 136.
38
Castrated male equines. [Write in sentences!]
39
Friedman, supra note 25, at 136.
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enhancer proliferated among trainers, but in 2003, Pennsylvania racing officials found
that more than 60% of all horses racing in that state had been treated with at least one
steroid.40
Despite this apparently long and sordid history of doping in horse racing, it has
only been within the past decade or so that the interest of the general public has been
piqued. As was previously alluded to, the highly publicized steroid scandals in Major
League Baseball around some of the sport’s greatest players spurred the interest of both
lawmakers and casual fans to at least consider the PED climate in other sports.41 Events
emanating from within the horse racing world itself, however, are what have contributed
to the recent impetus for change.
One such event occurred at the 2008 Kentucky Derby, where a horse named Eight
Belles finished in second place at the race, but—having just passed the finish line,
collapsed from two broken ankles.42 Disturbingly, Eight Belles was then euthanized on
the track in front of 200,000 spectators and millions more watching on television at
home.43 A mere few days later, the trainer of the victorious horse from the Derby, Big
Brown, glibly admitted that the horse was treated with the steroid Winstrol right before
the race, and he would continue to treat Big Brown and other horses with steroids to
enhance their performance prior to every race.44
The shockingly casual nature of the trainer’s admission raised eyebrows in the
mainstream public, but perhaps the most damning high visibility event of recent years

40

Id. at 137.
Id. at 140.
42
Id. at 141.
43
Runner-up Eight Belles Breaks Front Ankles, Euthanized on Track,
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/horse/triplecrown08/news/story?id=3380100 (May 3, 2008).
44
Bill Finley, New York Unveils Steroid-Free Racing, 158 N.Y. Times B8 (Jan. 2, 2009)
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/sports/othersports/02racing .html.
41
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was an explosive PETA report on another prominent trainer, Steve Asmussen. Asmussen
is one of the most highly recognizable trainers in the industry, and arguably the most
successful. He ranks second in career victories, totaling more than 6,700, has earned
more than $214 million in winnings and was even included on the National Museum of
Racing’s Hall of Fame Ballot.45 Over a period of several months, an undercover PETA
employee clandestinely filmed the regular routines engaged in by his assistant trainers:
practices that included administering multiple drugs daily to racehorses — “whether they
(needed) them or not — by grooms and employees so they (could) pass veterinarians’
visual inspections, make it to the racetrack or perform at a higher level.”46 This video
contained more than seven hours of footage documenting various forms of mistreatment,
including prominent New York veterinarians administering drugs to the horses.47 The
subsequent[public?] outrage called for wide-spread reform efforts, but also a desire by
regulators and fans to gain a deeper understanding of the exact effects certain drugs can
have on the animals.
PART III. EFFECTS OF DRUG ABUSE
A. Common Uses of Performance-Enhancing Drugs
In conducting the analysis of the drugs used in horseracing, it is prudent to first
point out that no uniform consensus exists on whether all drugs should be banned outright
from the sport. Indeed, many drugs have therapeutic qualities that do not affect the racing
performance of horses.48 Two of the more commonly used permissible drugs are Lasix

45

Joe Drape, PETA Accuses Two Trainers of Cruelty to Horses, N.Y. Times B13 (Mar. 20, 2014)
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/sports/peta-accuses-two-trainers-of-cruelty-to-horses.html?_r=2.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Kimberli Gasparon, Comment, The Dark Horse of Drug Abuse: Legal Issues of Administering
Performance-Enhancing Drugs to Racehorses, 16 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 199, 206 (2009).
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and Bute, both of which help to guard against excessive bleeding in the lungs.
Phenylbutazone (an anti-inflammatory), and Cortiscosteroids (for pain) are also staples of
most training stables.49 Steroids, on the other hand, are anecdotally used for the express
purpose of bolstering racing performance. Steroids increase protein synthesis and
resultantly increase a horse's metabolism, which coupled with an increase in diet, can
result in overall growth in muscle mass.50 There is, however, little scientific or clinical
data directly linking steroid use to the physical denigration of horses; the correlation lies
in the fact that horses bred for racing possess relatively delicate skeletal frames that
cannot support the massive addition of muscle mass spurred by consumption of
steroids.51
B. Physical Consequences and Impact of Use
Unlike the use of steroids by humans, performance-enhancing drugs for horses
can very quickly adversely impact the body of a horse. An increase in testosterone (or a
synthetic alternative), for example, can create dangerous behavior in horses such as
aggressiveness and “stallion-like” activity in otherwise perfectly trained and tamed
mares.52 Most of the drugs allegedly used result in an exponential increase in blood
volume, forcing a horse’s heart to process 65% more volume than normal even when in a
sedentary state.53 While such side-effects are by no means trivial, they pale in comparison
to the effects of drugs that can directly lead to fatal breakdowns on race days. “Two of
the more common substances—phenylbuterol and demorphine (the key ingredient in

49

Max Watman, So Far, So Good For Barbaro, N.Y. Sun (May 21, 2006) http://www.nysun.com/sports/sofar-so-good-for-barbaro/33099/.
50
Friedman, supra note 25, at 137, 138.
51
Id. at 140.
52
Id. at 139.
53
Id.
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cobra venom)—act as painkillers that mask a horse’s nervous system so that it can run
harder and feel little pain.”54 It is highly suspected that this was the precise causation of
the tragic death of Eight Belles at the 2008 Kentucky Derby, (i.e. the horse was unable to
heed bodily warnings to slow down, resulting in the breaking of both ankles and
subsequent euthanasia).55 [parenthetical info should be placed in fn]
In addition to concealing injuries, the administration of these types of drugs can
also render pre-race health and safety examinations conducted on the horses moot.56
California researchers have found that as many as 90 percent of horses that break down
have pre-existing ailments or injuries.57 It is therefore widely contended that even legal,
therapeutic drugs that serve merely as pain medicine actually pose the greatest risk to the
horse, and this contention served as the primary driving force in England’s ban of any
type of drug use in the sport.58 Significantly, the rate of horses fatally breaking down in
England is now, on a percentage basis, [only?] half of what it is in the United States.59
According to Dr. Manual Gilman, a New York racing steward, "any fair-minded person
would say horses would be better off if they ran without medication,” noting that “it's not
natural. Any medication has side effects."60

54

Daniel Stone, Should Congress Police Horseracing?, The Daily Beast (Jul. 12, 2012),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/12/should-congress-police-horseracing.html.
55
Id.
56
Walt Bogdanich, Joe Drape, Dara Miles and Griffin Palmer, Mangled Horses, Maimed Jockeys, N.Y.
Times A1 (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/us/death-and-disarray-at-americasracetracks.html?_r=0.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Joseph Durso, Horse Racing: Thoughts from The Glass Booth, N.Y. Times (Dec. 5, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/05/sports/horse-racing-thoughts-from-the-glass-booth.html. [Ancent
history?]
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Perhaps one of the more troubling facts of the state of drug abuse in the sport is
that these types of incidents continue to occur at the highest level of racing—especially
the Triple Crown races, which receive far more scrutiny and attention than the lower tier
“claiming races.”61 It therefore begs the question of how pervasive and destructive an
effect drug abuse is having away from the proverbial spotlight, where regulatory and
public interest is even more scant. “Horses in (claiming) races are most vulnerable (to
drug abuse), in part because regulators often give them less protection from potentially
dangerous drugs.”62 In fact a New York Times study discovered horses in claiming races
have a 22 percent greater chance of breaking down or showing signs of injury than horses
in higher grade races, which strongly suggests that drug abuse is even more rampant and
destructive at the lower levels of racing.63 [What years were included in the study? This
is important to determine if it’s a current problem] When considering the obvious perils
of drug use on horses, in conjunction with the apparent extensive prevalence of this
practice throughout the sport at all levels, it quickly becomes clear that reform is needed,
and that the existing controls on the industry are not acceptable safeguards for combating
this growing problem.
PART IV. SURVEY AND ANALYIS OF EXISTING REGULATORY
CONTROLS
Before addressing proposed remedies for eliminating or at the very least curbing
the use of performance-enhancing drugs on racehorses, it is first necessary to examine the
existing regulatory controls on the horse racing industry both internally and externally

61

Bogdanich, supra note 56.
Id.
63
Id.
62
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which seek to mitigate the use of performance-enhancing drugs. This section will address
the underlying root causes behind the drug use, examine the major governance models
and jurisdictional rules in place across several states, and finally identify the primary
failures of these controls.
A. Factors Necessitating Regulation: Root Causes of Drug Abuse
i.

The Influx of Money and Corresponding Corruptive Influence
Despite a comparative decline in popularity from its “heyday” in the midTwentieth Century, horse racing has still managed to become a $10 billion annual
industry, accounting for nearly 400,000 jobs.64 A good portion of this growth is the
direct result of a 1978 federal policy that permitted betting on the sport across state
lines.65 Between the late 1980’s and 2001, the gross amount wagered on horse racing
domestically increased from $9.385 billion ($19.775 billion in today’s dollars after
accounting for inflation) to $14.550 billion ($20.258 billion in today’s dollars).66 “With
this increase, purses for each race have climbed from $ 700 million to over $ 1 billion
from 1990 to 2001.”67Accounting for inflation, in today’s dollars the $1 billion figure
from 2001 would be equivalent to nearly $1.4 billion.68 [Data is 16 years old??]
The sport has also benefitted from so-called “racinos” in several states that have
converted race tracks into casinos (or merged them); several states have used these new
venues as a way to “expand gambling, and that require the more-popular and profitable
casino operations to effectively subsidize the racing purses.”69 The betting attention

64

Stone, supra note 54.
Id.
66
Encyclopedia of American History, Horse racing and showing, http://www.answers.com/topic/horseracing-and-showing (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
67
Id.
68
CPI Inflation Calculator, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 27, 2017).
69
Stone, supra note 54.
65
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focused on winning horses as purses in smaller races has dramatically increased due to
the casino money now poured into them, resulting in the horses oftentimes being run or
chemically augmented beyond their natural capacity.70 As noted in the prior section when
discussing the claiming races, smaller racing venues that operate far away from the
national stage merit more attention from regulators and policy makers because there are a
far greater number of horse races at these types of forums than the large events, such as
the Triple Crown, but the general attention and scrutiny is far less. [Break up long,
multic-clause sentences!] As such, drug abuse is even more prevalent. As will be
discussed further in the foregoing sections, smaller racing venues [should] require the
same level of standards and penalties as the major events.
ii.

Challenges of Current Drug Testing Systems
The myriad of drugs and medications now readily available for horses has proven
to be highly cumbersome for existing testing structures to protect against because there
are legitimate medical uses for steroids in racehorses. “Unlike with humans, where a
medication can often be traced back to a doctor or prescription, it is not always possible
to distinguish whether a steroid was given to a horse for a therapeutic purpose or as a
performance enhancer.”71
There currently exist only two processes for testing horses for steroids, urinalysis
and blood tests. The problem with each is that neither has been fully developed, nor has
either been clinically proven to have the accuracy required to enforce existing rules.72
Moreover, there are other related issues that make the accuracy of both forms of testing

70

Id.
Friedman, supra note 25, at 143.
72
Kimberly S. Brown, TheHorse.com: The Steroid Debate, (May 1, 2008),
http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=11789.
71
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tenuous. Not enough is known about how quickly or completely steroids pass through a
horse's system.73 In addition, not enough research has been done to accurately determine
which steroids are present in positive samples.74
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the current testing system, however, lies in the
fact that laboratories are unable to keep up with the newest “cutting-edge” drugs made
available by illicit chemists.75 Furthermore, trainers continue to try to evade the
restrictions of the testing protocol by experimenting with “anything that might give them
an edge, including cobra venom, Viagra, blood doping agents, stimulants and cancer
drugs.”76 To this end, racing officials have long maintained that a great deal of illegal
doping “occurs on private farms before horses are shipped to the track”, which is by
design since few states are legally able to test horses there.77
B. Summary of Existing Regulatory Controls and their Shortcomings
Racing's lack of a powerful, central authority is a primary reason for the
performance-enhancing drug issues that are plaguing the sport.78 Given the gravity and
size of the sport, there are shockingly few restrictions on drugs in horse racing, due to the
fact that there is no broad “oversight agency to regulate industry practices, police
offenders, and levy fines, and in part because the athletes are animals. Most regulation

73

Frank Angst, Steroid Study Reveals Wide Variance in Steroid Residue, (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www
.thoroughbredtimes.com/national-news/2009/March/04/Steroid-study-reveals-wide-variance-in-steroidresidue.aspx.
74
Masayuki Yamada et al., Detection of Urinary Metabolites Common to Structurally Related 17a-Alkyl
Anabolic Steroids in Horses and Application to Doping Tests in Racehorses: Methandienone, Methandriol,
and Oxymetholone, 32 J. Analytical Toxicology 387, 387-91 (June 2008).
75
Bogdanich, supra note 56.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Breslin, supra note 18, at 315.
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falls to individual state boards that issue a mosaic of sometimes conflicting rules on how
a horse should be raised, run, and tested.”79
While many of the jurisdictions prohibit the use of certain drugs, relatively few
tests exist to test the horses for those drugs.80 Trainers that do not face any sort of
criminal penalty therefore have little incentive to keep their horses free from
performance-enhancing drugs when they know they cannot and will not be caught.81
Furthermore, as previously alluded to, the existing tests are unreliable and frequently
result in false positives that unnecessarily penalize innocent trainers and owners.82
i.

State Racing Commissions
Unlike other major professional sports leagues such as Major League Baseball or
the National Football League, there is no national standard of rules [rule-making and
enforcing authority?] for drug testing in horse racing.83 Horse racing is governed in the
United States at the state and local levels through state racing commissions, which
thereby allow each state to regulate the sport as it sees fit. Indeed, the commissions
generally have wide-ranging authority that includes the power of rulemaking and
enforcement.84 Commissions, however, often pass regulations without having the
resources to test for illicit drug use and/or enforce the law.85 Furthermore, the general
lack of uniformity in the regulation and implementation of standards and enforcement of

79

Stone, supra note 54.
Gasparon, supra note 48, at 208.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
John Drape, Horse Racing: Amid the Run for the Roses, a new race to curb drug use, N.Y. Times (May
5, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/05/sports/horse-racing-amid-the-run-for-the-roses-a-new-raceto-curb-drug-use.html?_r=0.
84
Friedman, supra note 25, at 144.
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penalties has allowed the proliferation of performance-enhancing drugs and abuse of
medication.86
By virtue of the fact that the thirty-eight racing jurisdictions operate
autonomously, they are virtually by definition in some level of competition with one
another for profits. Tracks with more horses and races naturally lead to higher sales and
thus higher tax revenues generated for the local and state governments.87 Many racetracks
and local/state commissions are thus highly keen [incentivized?] to implement as friendly
conditions as possible for owners and trainers with an eye towards attracting more paying
customers. As one might expect, this oftentimes leads to more lenient regulations with
respect to drug testing.88 This is not to say that every state and local commission are
prone to overly lenient regulatory controls, but it does help foster a system that is
“disjointed and lacking in [uniform] control and accountability.”89
Beyond the governance hierarchy of the sport, the actual testing methodologies
that are performed in an effort to flush out the use of performance-enhancing drugs are
themselves riddled with inconsistencies. There are eighteen different labs in the United
States that are used to vet and test blood or urine samples from horses in the search for
[for the discovery of?] drug use; the problem is they employ eighteen different drugtesting protocols.90 Even under a hypothetical "zero tolerance" rule towards any
offenders, "zero tolerance" would not have the same criteria across all of the labs.91 In

86

Breslin, supra note 18, at 299.
Cassidy, supra note 14, at 129.
88
Id.
89
William Rhoden, Uncontrolled Sport May Not Merit Triple Crown Glory, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/sports/horse-racing-may-not-deserve-triple-crownglory.html?adxnnl=1&ref=tomudall&adxnnlx=1348668021-SC+dh6BGh1iHRC+S0VKgUw.
90
Christy West, AAEP 2008: Medication in Racing and Performance Horses, (Feb. 15, 2009),
http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=13614.
91
Id.
87

17

addition to a lack of uniform procedures, research conducted in the field has to date
provided no definitive answers regarding how long it takes a horse to reduce the levels of
a drug in its body to the legal limit.92
The testing criteria utilized among various officially sanctioned laboratories,
however, are not the extent of the inconsistency. Among the thirty-eight states that have
some form of horse racing, twenty-eight have no regulations whatsoever with respect to
anabolic steroids (interestingly, this includes the three states that host Triple Crown races
of Kentucky, Maryland and New York).93 [paraentetical info should be placed in fn]“The
remaining 10 states have a partial ban that makes an exception for four drugs—including
the steroid Winstrol. And in the states with more stringent rules, the prohibitions apply
only on race day, not during the months of training that come before.”94
Because there is no federal law regulating drug use in racing, let alone a clearly
defined industry-wide standard, regulators and commissions in individual states can be as
harsh or lenient as they wish in punishing violators.95 Take, for example, New Mexico.
Tests conducted on horses in New Mexico for the potent pain-killing medication Flunixin
yielded results over “104 nanograms on 68 occasions since 2009, with some registering
1,000 and even 2,400, records show.”96 These levels are so high that regulatory
veterinarians in other states say [have claimed that?] the horses must have been drugged
on race day, a practice that is forbidden.97 To give this example more context, it should
be noted that most test results for Flunixin register in between 35 and 50 nanograms.98
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Despite these dizzying numbers, the current penalties in New Mexico for trainers who
overmedicate their horses with the drug receive no punishment on their first violation, a
mere $200 fine on the second and $400 for the third.99 Additionally, New Mexico
removes any record of Flunixin violations every 12 months, thus allowing trainers to
again overmedicate horses without penalty. Dozens of huge Flunixin overdoses have
resulted in warnings only.100
By contrast, other states have taken far more punitive postures with regard to drug
offenses. Iowa, for instance, has implemented a blanket ban on steroid use in all
racehorses.101 In Indiana, all winnings must be forfeited after the first drug offense. The
rationale, as explained by Joe Gorajec, the executive director of the Indiana Horse Racing
Commission, is “If someone who violates the rule thinks the penalties are going to be
mild or nonexistent, then breaking the rules is just a cost of doing business.”102 By hitting
the offenders where it really hurts (i.e. their wallets) Indiana positions itself to be a far
more hostile environment towards would-be drug offenders. There is [appears to be?] no
clear-cut reason as to why certain states are comfortable taking such relaxed approaches
to drug enforcement whereas others are far less lenient.
The decentralized, state-centric model allows for this, however, and perhaps is
reflective of the cultural and demographic differences that define the United States [break
up long sentences]. [In fact, it seems to replicate other defiations, as manifested?] in the
various approaches to marijuana legalization, for example. The histories and local
cultures of various regions in the country inform the legislative appetite [approach?]for
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any number of policies, and it seems the regulation of horse racing is no different. [So,
notwithstatnding?] the noble and even effective measures taken in states like Iowa and
Indiana, the sport will never see [undergo?] the wholesale change to its culture it so
desperately needs unless uniform standards are adopted--a task that has yet to come to
fruition.
ii.

Legislative Efforts
Despite the pervasive nature of drugs in the sport, the issue has not been
unilaterally ignored by policy-makers either domestically or abroad. “The World AntiDoping Code unanimously was adopted103 by more than 600 sports organizations104 and
governments of the world in Copenhagen in March 2003 with 665 signatories binding
anti-doping regulation across all continents and sports.”105 Unfortunately, American
horse racing is not one of the signatories, primarily due to the fact that many stakeholders
in the industry either refuse to seek a harmonization of medication standards or deny that
there is a problem altogether.106 Although as is the case with many voluntary
international treaties, the actual enforcement measures are not particularly strong; the
issue with the lack of signage is the larger message being sent that the horse racing
industry has to date not viewed this drug epidemic as a problem worthy of greater
attention. The possible benefits associated with an international coalition such as this are
admittedly more symbolic; it is domestically and within the sport itself that true remedial
measures need to be taken.
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Legislative attempts in Congress to curb the destructive effects of drug abuse in
horse racing have not been met with much success. The Horseracing Integrity and Safety
Act of 2013 proposed the United States Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”) as "the
authority to permit/prohibit the drugs and medications that may be administered to a
horse in a race subject to an interstate off-track wager and set the withdrawal period for
its administration."107 Under this proposal, any horse receiving any drug within 24 hours
of a race [would be] prohibited from racing. Additionally, race tracks “must have an
agreement with USADA that includes terms and conditions regarding compliance with
rules”.108
The proponent of the bill, Congressman Joseph Pitts, stressed the need for a
uniform approach to fighting performance-enhancing drug abuse in the United States.
[break up long sentences. “He stated], "Despite promises and assurances, state and
industry groups have been unable to come together to develop uniform rules to police
doping. . . . Congress must step in to offer a sound national framework to protect the
horses, the riders, and the public."109 [It should be noted that?] The bill does not
necessitate the establishment of any new federal agencies, and calls for funding to come
from the industry through a percentage of the gambling bets or a series of fees from
racetracks, horsemen groups, breeders, and owners.110 A portion of the financing would
be collected from the racing associations, who before conducting a race with interstate,
off-track betting, must enter into an agreement with USADA and comply with its anti-
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doping rules.111 Unfortunately, [and] despite some initial bi-partisan support,112 it never
even succeeded in obtaining a vote in the House, let alone consideration in the Senate. A
revised version of the bill was proposed by the same sponsor in 2015, where it was
referred to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, where it
has not advanced.113 [This is a new Session—2017-18. Has it been resubmitted???]
There is not one clearly defined reason why progress on these efforts has stalled
and support has been minimal. However, there are a few theories. One is that industry
support for these measures is mixed as best, with a general reticence towards supporting
federal interventionist regulation, which has resulted in strong lobbying against
passage.114 “Separate from the racing industry’s split views on the anti-doping legislation,
another obstacle to passage might be the political climate of Washington, D.C. itself,”
[break up long sentences]. [“ The bill was assigned in both of its”]as the assignment of
both iterations of the bill to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and
Trade [“This has resulted in”]has presented lawmakers who possess only a passing
familiarity with “racing’s highly specialized wants and needs,” a comprehensive proposal
saturated with subject matter that is likely beyond their normal areas of expertise.115
Should some version of the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act pass [be
enacted], it would be the deepest and most meaningful foray Congress has made into the
regulation of horse racing beyond wagering. To date, the federal government has given

111

Id.
The bill had 35 total co-sponsors, 30 Democrats and 5 Republicans. See Congress (May 17, 2013),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/housebill/2012/cosponsors?q=%7B%22party%22%3A%22all%22%7D.
113
Congress (Jun. 3, 2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2641/allactions?overview=closed#tabs.
114
T.D. Thornton, What’s Next for Competing Anti-Doping Bills?, Thoroughbred Daily News, (July 21,
2015), http://www.thoroughbreddailynews.com/whats-next-for-competing-anti-doping-bills/.
115
Id.
112

22

little indication it has the ability (or motivation) to regulate the industry. The Interstate
Horseracing Act of 1978 (amended in 2007) holds that "it is the policy of the Congress in
this Act to regulate interstate commerce with respect to wagering on horse racing, in
order to further the horse racing and legal off-track betting industries in the United
States."116 This statute has limited the involvement of Congress to merely regulating
racing, solely with respect to wagering, thereby enabling discord by allowing each state
to draft its own regulations.
iii.

The Racing and Medication Testing Consortium (“RMTC): Model Rules
In 2001, the American Association of Equine Practitioners117 met to determine if

an agreement could be reached regarding the need for a uniform policy for racehorse
medication in the United States.118 The result of the summit was the Racing and
Medication Testing Consortium (“RMTC”), created to develop an industry-wide uniform
medication policy statement.119 The RMTC is comprised of 25 racing industry
stakeholders and organizations that represent all types of horse racing in the United
States, including trotters.120 “The RMTC has promulgated uniform model rules regarding
anabolic steroids that have been adopted by 26 states.”121 Most of these states that
currently regulate the use of steroids in horse racing have adopted the Model Rule either
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in their entirety or in a slightly altered form.122 Others, such as Kentucky, Maryland,
Pennsylvania and Washington have used the Model Rule as a baseline and either
strengthened or loosened many of its regulations.123
Despite the best intentions behind these efforts, however, there is no actual
binding, coercive legal authority that holds anyone [any of the potential violaters?]
accountable. The model rules provide a worthwhile standard of conduct to strive towards,
but arguably amount to little more than grandiose rhetoric lacking any tangible
enforcement authority. There also are some logistical issues with the Model Rules
themselves as they relate to the guidance around performance-enhancing drugs. “The
inability to distinguish the specific use of the steroid, for either therapeutic or
performance-enhancing purposes, coupled with the fact that there is a requalification
carve-out involving the veterinarian's list, causes major enforcement issues.”124
C. Insufficient Deterrence To Recalcitrant Trainers and Owners
It is self-evident from the preceding analysis that the existing testing procedures
and penalties for violation do not create an ample enough deterrent to trainers and owners
who seek to circumvent the rules. The actual tangible impact to the trainer’s long term
disposition in the sport is minimal even when punitive measures are enacted because in
many cases, upon being suspended, they can simply transfer control of the horse to their
assistant.125 It might be naïve to suspect the trainer’s assistant would for some reason
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adopt a more ethical posture towards the treatment of the horses in the primary trainer’s
absence, but even if that were the case, the trainer’s access and right to the stable is fully
restored upon completion of their suspension.126 Therefore, more sweeping, corrective
actions must take place in order to curb this problem.
PART V. PROPOSED REMEDIAL MEASURES
As [demonstrated?], it is evident from the vastly disjointed and disparate nature of
horse racing jurisdictions that the lack of uniformity in regulations and enforcement is the
primary underlying cause that enables rampant drug abuse to saturate the sport,
endangering the well-being of the animals. While there is admittedly no guaranteed
remedy available that would instantly [quickly?] rectify all of the outstanding drug issues,
what is beyond dispute is the current de-centralized, mostly unregulated model is
woefully inadequate in preserving the health of the horses and the competitive integrity
of the sport. Therefore, This section will propose several action steps that can be enacted
(ideally in concert with one another) to help cleanse the sport of its performanceenhancing drug issues.
A. Implementation of Uniform, Federal Legislation
The most obvious solution to cure the untenable inconsistency in regulation and
application of enforcement measures would be to have the United States Congress enact a
law that would explicitly outline standards, guidelines and punishments for drug offenses
in all forms of horse racing. This of course presupposes a functional, operational
Congress, something that has been conspicuously absent from the political landscape in
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the recent past.127 As has been discussed, some states have been more diligent in
attempting to combat this problem than others, but because there has not been any sort of
uniform coalition among the states to impose stricter sanctions on the industry as a
whole, federal legislation may be the best opportunity at doing so.
The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2013 (and a later iteration proposed
in 2015) [but what about its status in 2017 Congressional Session?] offers the most
comprehensive and reasonable solution towards establishing a coherent anti-drug culture
in horse racing. To reiterate, the chief aim of the law would be to “police thoroughbred
doping and medication abuse via the establishment of a federal, non-governmental racing
regulatory organization headed by the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA).”128
Despite the bi-partisan nature of the proposed law, it has struggled to solicit the necessary
support to even come close to a vote, let alone receive passage. “GovTrack, a government
transparency organization that uses logistic regression analysis to rank the likelihood of
passage of the 10,000 bills that come up annually in Congress,” gives the Bill a 5%
chance of getting past committee and a 2% chance of being enacted.129 [This data should
be put in fn] Simply put, the passage of this bill would offer the most holistic and
substantive reform of drug abuse in horse racing. Even in this era of divided government
and finite resources, one would hope the revival of this bill would not be too ambitious of
a goal for our elected representatives.
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[But] Should the passage of this bill prove too cumbersome [difficult?] for
Congress, another solution could be the amendment of an existing law, i.e. the Interstate
Horseracing Act. Specifically, the law could be amended to broaden the federal
government’s authority over the entire horse racing industry by adding required layers of
compliance with drug prevention standards. Although realistically spurring Congress to
act decisively on any issue may be an ambitious goal, the recently elected President has
professed a strong appetite for cutting back on perceived superfluous regulations.130 As
such, the chances of amending an existing regulation, rather than adding a new one
dealing with similar subject matter, may be slightly more palatable. Furthermore, the
chief aim would be to mitigate the effects of drug abuse on horses in the sport, which
could still be achieved by incentivizing certain behaviors and barring others in the
existing law which ostensibly is only concerned with gambling.
According to the Interstate Horseracing Act, the federal government has interstate
commerce authority over wagering and off-track betting.131 To allow for the federal
government to regulate the entire horse racing industry, Congress could [would have?]
amend the Interstate Horseracing Act to include language establishing a uniform
regulatory structure around drug testing (including language allowing testing to be
conducted off-site on the private training farms of the racehorses), and the permissibility
of certain types of medication/treatment, etc.[avoid “etc.” in formal writing] Penalties for
violation could include a complete ban on taking interstate bets on races that include
horses that have failed drug tests. This could be facilitated by mandating a pre-race
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testing requirement for all horses participating in races with interstate wagering.
Furthermore, should a given jurisdiction or state become a repeat offender in failure to
fully comply, the federal government would have the authority to suspend all wagering
on horse racing in that state altogether. Although this may seem like a hard-line approach,
the threat of cutting off wagering profits would unequivocally garner the attention of the
local states and their respective racing commissions, and would force them to take the
issue seriously.132
Although neither of the above proposals is currently being actively discussed
[considered?]within Congress, this could quickly change with the engagement of
appropriate lobbying and advocacy efforts. Organizations such as the American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals133 and PETA134 already actively participate in
grassroots and political lobbying to advance legislative and policy agendas that call for
the more favorable treatment of animals. Should these two collaborate to raise public and
political awareness, perhaps [in collaboration with] other like-minded organizations
within the animal rights field [sector?], traction could be gained within Congress to
support one or both of the legislative efforts proposed above.
B. Establish a Centralized Office to Oversee and Police the Sport
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There have been calls from those both within the horse racing industry and
external to it, to create a national governing body in the mold of the organizational
structures of other professional sports leagues. This would allow a clear system of rules
across jurisdictions to be implemented, with a uniform testing and penalty system for
which all industry participants would be held accountable.
There currently exists a loosely interconnected bureaucracy of organizations
within the sport that could be leveraged as a basis for formulating this new central office.
The Jockey Club already controls the breeding and licensing of all domestic
racehorses.135 The National Thoroughbred Racing Association (NTRA) currently serves
as "both league office for a big sport and trade association for a big industry, including
related businesses like breeding."136 Additionally, the basic framework for uniform rules
and regulations in horse racing is already in place via organizations such as the RMTC,
ARCI, and the Thoroughbred Safety Committee.
The creation of a new organization by leveraging existing structures and rules
would serve as the most efficient allocation of time and resources to combat the issue.
There is likely no existing federal body that could assume this role as easily as the
amalgam of existing organizations within the industry forging together into a single
entity. By establishing a national organization, the industry would be drastically better
positioned to implement uniform and effective drug regulations. The organization could
also establish a system of penalties that would have the same effect nationally, and
dedicate resources to research new and effective ways of combating drug abuse. As
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already alluded to, the challenge with this approach would likely be finding the requisite
support among the various jurisdictions for coming together and forging a single entity.
In evaluating what other existing sports league could serve as useful templates for
horse racing to mirror in terms of corporate structure, the most apt analogy may actually
be the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”).137 “The NCAA is an
unincorporated organization composed of nearly 1,000 voluntary members, which are
four-year college institutions with competitive athletic programs”.138 The NCAA has a
central authority body which has the ability to create committees dedicated to specific
programs, however, each member school maintains the ability to govern and rule within
its own parameters to some degree, thereby not totally eliminating their autonomy.
Adopting something similar in horse racing would allow “state agencies to retain their
power while also implementing uniform rules,” most obviously those around
performance-enhancing drugs.139 DOUBLE-SPACE
This would also allow for changes or updates to the rules, based upon updated research or
testing techniques, to be more easily implemented than a system with pure federal
oversight that would need congressional approval for any change.
Because it seems apparent there will likely not be a cultural epiphany within the
sport to begin collectively addressing this issue via the formation of a centralized
authority under its own volition, it seems the only effective motivation could be from the
threat of the previously mentioned congressional intervention. This would not be without
precedent. Following gamblers “fixing” the outcome of the 1919 World Series, Major
League Baseball adopted a more formal organizational structure, including the
appointment of its first commissioner to oversee the league and enforce it rules more
stringently,140 with the implicit understanding this would stave off congressional
intervention. Many industry stakeholders have long opposed the idea of federal
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oversight,141 thus much like the pressure applied to other sports leagues that forced them
to act on their internal issues, this may prove to be the only ample incentive to spark true
reform in horse racing via the formation of a central league.
C. Forge a Collaborative Effort Between Regulators and Industry Officials to Fund
New Testing Methods and Enact Harsher Penalties
In addition to establishing a uniform system of rules and regulations, along with a
strong, centralized body to enforce them, the horse racing industry must also work to
develop innovative and effective testing procedures. It is therefore imperative that the
labs used to vet test samples coordinate their efforts to eliminate the inconsistent testing
methods. “Currently, in the United States racehorses' test samples are submitted to one of
a number of labs, both privately and state funded. It is difficult for the various states and
private organizations to develop the best testing procedures, primarily due to insufficient
funding.”142 It is therefore recommended that the industry foot the majority of the cost
for heightened testing procedures. It is submitted that they probably have far greater
expertise in the nuances of the sport and what needs to be guarded against. Moreover, as
a matter of public policy, it would seem irresponsible for an excessive amount of
taxpayer funds to be directed to a problem that the private sector should be equipped to
handle. Despite the relative popularity the sport still enjoys among fans, the public’s
interest by no means is so great as to warrant a significant expenditure of taxpayer
dollars. If there is one uniform regime that defines the standards and penalties, whether
from federal regulation or industry-specific rulemaking, the laboratories could simply be
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instructed to follow the guidelines put in place as a means to permanently eliminate the
disparate testing protocols that plague the sport today.
Following an agreed upon baseline of rules and testing procedures, it then
becomes critical--whether by federal regulation or drastically increased internal industry
rules--the punishments for offenders becomes severe. The model employed in England
seems to be particularly effective, wherein there is a complete ban on all drugs for horses.
As was discussed earlier,143 the rate of fatal horse breakdowns in England is much lower
than in the United States; with all other conditions being more or less equal it then
becomes reasonable to deduce their far divergent handling of drug abuse is the primary
driver of this disparity. This may be viewed as an overly-conservative approach,
however, as there are certain drugs that can provide therapeutic value to horses.144 Break
up long sentences. “But such harsh action”] would dispel any sort of ambiguity around
what drugs would qualify as a policy violation.
One need not look as far as “across the pond” for templates on how to curb this
issue, however. As discussed earlier, models employed by states such as Iowa and
Indiana take a far harsher stance on drug abuse in horse racing than others, with the
former employing a complete ban on all drugs and the latter mandating the forfeiture of
winnings for horses that test positive for drugs.145 Incorporating elements of the
regulatory regimes utilized in those two states, and/or England, would likely create potent
enough standards and penalties to serve as ample deterrence to the continued abuse of the
animals.
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[As to the resultant penalties?], it is submitted that for an initial offense of a horse
failing a drug test, a one year suspension from all organized racing activity be levied on
the jockey, trainer, owner and the horse itself. This would include a formal ban on access
to all tracks and racing facilities associated with the newly formed league. The prospect
of losing a full year of racing out of a horse, whose prime racing years are very limited to
start, would be a devastating consequence for any ownership/training group.
Additionally, there would be a two-year “look-back” provision embedded in the rules
which would force all earnings won with that horse over the prior two years to be
forfeited. The money would be provided to the central league office and then dedicated
toward further drug testing research. This would instill a culture of accountability, where
all interested parties would be forced to be extremely mindful of the conduct of every
member on their teams, from top (owners) to bottom (jockeys).
To further enforce this accountability, the second offense for a failed test would
result in an immediate lifetime ban from the sport for all parties involved (jockey, trainer,
owner and horse). All intervening winnings between the first failed test and the second
failed test would again be forfeited. Furthermore, in addition to mandatory testing on the
day of each race, horses would be subject to random drug testing at any time of year, with
only 24 hours notice. This would include the ability for testing authorities to administer
drug tests on the farms/trainer facilities where the horses are kept, thereby eliminating
another venue where drug abuse is widely believed to be taking place.146 These efforts
would further mitigate the risk of trainers simply timing the horse’s drug cycle to
synchronize with known testing dates and locations.

146

Bogdanich, supra note 56.
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As an added layer of defense to guard against [persistent,] rampant abuse, it is
submitted that racetracks could be mandated to have their licenses revoked if more than
5% of their registered horses fail drug tests in a calendar year. The threat of closure and
subsequent loss of business would invariably stir more interest in ensuring the horses are
racing clean, and would place even more pressure on the general culture of the sport to
evolve in such a way that will protect against drug use. Racetracks would presumably be
far more cautious in vetting the horses/ownership groups being invited to compete, and
would likely invest far more time and effort in performing due diligence before races to
ensure the participants are fully compliant with the rules.
As a final recommendation, should the threat of pecuniary penalty not serve as a
powerful enough motivation to halt this behavior, harsher penalties must be [imposed?]
contemplated. If after a five year period with the aforementioned penalties in place yields
little to no change in the fatal breakdown numbers of horses at American racetracks,
and/or more than 10% of all test samples come back positive,147 criminal sanctions must
be implemented holding jockeys, trainers and owners criminally liable for the well-being
of their horses. This is of course presupposing federal or legislative cooperation, whether
at the onset of these rules or after the five year period has elapsed. All of these proposed
penalties are unquestionably harsh. But, if the possibility of inflicting irreparable damage
or death to these innocent animals is not enough of a deterrent to industry stakeholders
who intentionally pump them full of drugs, perhaps [loss of employment or ownership?]
the prospect of needing to find another source of income or the threat of incarceration
will suffice.

147

The newly formed governing body would be responsible for monitoring and tracking these figures.
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PART VI. CONCLUSION
Unlike the all-stars and pro bowlers [professionals?] of other major sports, the
animal athletes in horse racing do not naturally seek the fame, glory and attention sought
by their human counterparts. Indeed, an ideal day for a stallion would probably be
comprised of a hearty romp through a meadow to a grove of readily available carrots and
oats. It is therefore reprehensible that so many of them are flagrantly abused with various
chemical concoctions--all in the name of furthering the success of their owners and
trainer within the horse racing industry. The reasons for the prevalence of this abuse are
many, but the more pressing concern for industry officials and policy makers should be
finding solutions to curbing the problem before it envelops [damages?] more innocent
horses. A uniform federal law defining standards and penalties, ideally in conjunction
with the establishment of a central office of the sport to carry out and enforce agreedupon testing standards with better funded testing protocols and clearly defined, harsher
penalties, would be a tremendous start to rectifying the litany of performance-enhancing
drug issues that have been plaguing professional horse racing for years.
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